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Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics And Benedictine Monasticism: A Comparison of  Systems and Values

By: Br. Silas Henderson OSB

The philosopher Aristotle was born at Thrace about 384 BC.  Traveling to Athens when he was about seventeen years of age, he became a member of Plato’s Academy around the year 368 BC.  Following Plato’s death sometime around 348 BC, Aristotle left Athens and founded his own branch of the Academy at Assos.  It was here that Aristotle began to develop his own independent views and theories.  After many travels and serving as the tutor of Alexander the Great for a time, Aristotle returned to Athens in 355 where he founded his own school at the Lyceum.  Following the death of Alexander the Great in 323, Aristotle again left Athens traveling to Chalcis in Euboea where he died of an illness around 322 BC.[1]

             The extensive writings of Aristotle can be grouped according to three periods of composition.  It was during the third of these periods, the time of his leadership of the Lyceum, that Aristotle wrote a number of ethical and political works.  Among these is The Nicomachean Ethics, so named for Aristotle’s son, Nicomachus, who edited them after his father’s death.[2]  It is Aristotle’s understanding of virtue and the end of human actions as presented in The Nicomachean Ethics that will be the subject of this paper.  We will also examine certain aspects of Christianity’s Benedictine monastic tradition in light Aristotle’s ethical system; two schools of thought, that while not historically or philosophically related, share a number of similar themes and values.

Aristotle’s Ethics

Aristotle believed that ethics was not a theoretical science but a practical one that held meaning not only for the individual, but also for the entire city-state.  Politics was considered to be the “master art”[3] as it studies the good for man.  While the state and the individual do share the same good, this good, as it exists in the state, is ultimately nobler and greater.[4]  However, this theoretical “good” must be identified.

Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature.[5]

It is according to the knowledge of each man that one can judge what is good for man (and by extension the state/community).  Aristotle recognizes that, “both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that [the good] is happiness.”[6] 

While there is a consensus that happiness is the ultimate end of human actions, individuals disagree on what this happiness really is.[7]  So it is that “all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good”[8] with some identifying happiness as pleasure, others wealth, and still others honor.[9]  These same men will also understand happiness in different ways according to different life situations.  Philosopher Kathleen Wilkes writes,

A good or happy life becomes, in part at least, one that works, and works over time—a life wherein the minimum is missing and the least inner conflict is found.  To achieve this a man must analyze his amorphous notion of what a good life would be; this involves a reflective assessment not only of his own short-term and long-term needs and interests but also of whatever other desiderata society in general… find important.[10]

It should be noted here that the “man” of Aristotle is one who has received an “all-round education.”[11]  The purpose of the Nicomachean Ethics is not to persuade or to show one how to live, but “to give people who are already leading a happy, virtuous life insight into the nature of their own souls.”[12]  Those capable of living an ethical life were the elite middle class Greek males who were endowed with property, health, fortune, and leisure. Aristotle writes:

[Happiness] needs external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment.  In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things that lack of which takes the luster from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, and beauty.[13]

So it is that Aristotle distinguishes between having and leading a good life, and he maintains that a person who is lacking in material goods cannot be happy.[14]  It is in having these certain goods that we are able to lead a good life and count ourselves as happy. 

            A happiness that is based on the notions of pleasure, wealth, and honor, as mentioned above, cannot be an ultimate good.  Aristotle notes that pleasure is the good of vulgar men[15], wealth cannot be the end but is rather, in itself, a means to other ends[16], and honor is considered too superficial to be the good that we seek, “since it is thought to depend on those who bestow [it] rather than on him who receives honor.”[17]  The “good” Aristotle is seeking is one that cannot be taken away.

            These goods are ultimately subordinate to the highest goal: Eudaimonia.  “Eudaimonia might be translated as human flourishing or fulfillment, proper and full human functioning, or inner peace.”[18]  This is the goal in itself and this can be understood to mean that the happy life is “one in which man deeply fulfills his nature.”[19]  This realization of man’s nature is the virtuous life and it is this knowledge that allows one to direct the actions of one’s life.  As Coppleston notes, “Happiness [Eudaimonia] is an activity and an activity of man.”[20]    In order to understand this more fully, we must discern this activity of man, that is, the function of man.[21] 

Life, as it is common even to plants, and sense perception, as this is common to every animal, will not reveal the good of man and are not man’s function.  The function of man, something unique to him, is “an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle.”[22]  Aristotle writes, “[H]uman good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there is more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.”[23]  This means that the active use of reason is man’s special function.  This is not simply the use of reason, but the “excellent use of reason”[24], which is virtuous activity.  This is the end toward which all other goals are directed and human fulfillment/happiness and, since it is based in this human function, is the universal good. 

            It has been noted above that the human good is the active soul working in accordance with the most complete virtue.  According to Aristotle, virtue is

a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.[25]

Here we begin to recognize what is often called Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean.”[26]

            This “doctrine” is based on an intermediate between excess and defect within an action or object.[27]  All good actions have a certain proportion and virtue, in this system, is the mean between two extremes as relative to us.[28]  In order to understand this more fully, let us examine, for example, the moral virtue related to the feeling of anger.  Based on the idea that virtue is reason informing and regulating feelings and actions, we can recognize that with respect to anger we can see that an excess of this would be a short temper.  The corresponding defect/lack of this feeling is apathy/indifference.  In discerning the mean we can recognize that gentleness would stand between the excess of a short temper and the defect of apathy.  A gentle person can be said to respond appropriately to tense or abrasive situations: restraining or acting out according to each situation or circumstance.

            In speaking of a mean, Aristotle is not thinking in terms of a mathematical formula for seeking a balance or middle ground.  He specifies in his definition that it is the mean as “relative to us”.  Much depends on the feeling or action in relation to specific circumstances and situations.  “In some cases it may be preferable to err on the side of excess rather than on that of defect, while in other cases the reverse may be true.”[29] 

For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle, e.g. to find the middle of a circle is not for every one but for him who knows; so, too, any one can get angry—that is easy—or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, and to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble.[30]

            How then is virtue acquired?  The answer very simply comes down to practice.  “By repetition, virtue becomes habit; it becomes part of our character.”[31]  The practice of a virtue presupposes a rational choice.  Our natural inclinations have in themselves no moral value.  An act becomes a virtue or vice only when a rational choice is made; this means rational control and deliberate surrender.  Aristotle writes:

The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work.  Now there are three things in the soul which control action and truth—sensation, reason, desire.  Of these sensations originates no actions; this is plan from the fact that the lower animals have sensations but no share in action…since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts.[32]

This kind of understanding is practical.  The origin of our actions is our choice and reasoning with a view towards the end.  So it is that choice cannot exist without reason and intellect.[33]  Aristotle’s emphasis on a practical understanding in the formation of habit leads him to believe that true moral training involves more than learning to distinguish between and practice right and wrong actions.[34]  One must also develop the right likes and dislikes, attractions and repulses, and appropriate feelings.  Here we are speaking of one’s character.[35]  One’s desires and feelings must be brought into line with right reason so that the virtuous person will take pleasure in right actions and experience an aversion to wickedness.  These feelings are an expression of his reason.[36]

            Ultimately within this system, having and leading a good life are both essential to eudaimonia.  For Aristotle, the highest use of reason lies beyond the discovery of the mean between excess and defect in actions, which, while it is a proper function of man’s reason, is not the highest use of reason.  Here he turns his thoughts to contemplation.  It is both the possession of material goods (having a good life) and virtuous habits (leading a good life) that allow the leisure and right-orientation for this act, both of these having been shown to be necessary for human flourishing. 

            Human activity is “intensified by its proper pleasure, since each class of things is better judged of and brought to precision by those who engage in the activity with pleasure.”[37]  With these words Aristotle points out the relationship between activity and pleasure.  The logical extension of this idea is that pleasure will accompany those things which we love[38] and pleasure intensifies our actions, making man more inclined to do that which brings pleasure.  In the case of one who is well formed in the habits of virtue, pleasure will accompany his actions, encouraging him to act more rightly/virtuously, and therefore experience a more complete happiness.

If the highest expression of reason is man’s contemplation of unchanging truths, then contemplation has as its ultimate end the God who is unchanging.[39]  It is therefore in the exercise of reason concerning the noblest objects that man’s complete happiness is to be found.  This life “expresses the divine element in man…we ought to put off our mortality and do all we can to live the life to which the highest element in us points.”[40]  The ultimate happiness for man, man’s fulfillment, includes the leisure give over one’s life to philosophy (to contemplate God) as based on the possession of material goods and the life of virtue.[41]

Christian Monasticism

While there are obvious implications in this ethical system for the Scholastic Movement of the late middle-ages, particularly in the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274)[42], this system did not have a direct impact on the origins of the Platonic-oriented values and ideals of Christian monasticism.  This is particularly true of the Benedictine tradition of monasticism that developed sixth century Italy.

A desire to grow, to conquer human nature, lay at the heart of Christian Monasticism.  The structures, theologies, philosophies and traditions of monasticism, a lay movement, invite and challenge the monk to rise above his pride and ambition, excessive curiosity and unrestrained concupiscence[43].    Within the Benedictine tradition the vows of Obedience, Stability and Conversatio Morum[44], wearing the habit, community rank, the hours of prayer, and a spirit of sacrifice and penance, all serve to facilitate our experience of God[45] and compel the monk to live for something beyond himself. 

            In their search to understand the meaning of sin and its consequences, the early Christian writers began to develop an ideological system that sought to combat man’s self-preference and misdirected actions as it had come to be understood by the light of faith and relying on Sacred Scriptures.  Christian monasticism can be seen as the outgrowth of this system.

            Even before the time of Augustine, men and woman had realized that within humankind there is an underlying preference for self and lesser goods.  Some historians place the origins of the monastic movement in the mid-third century or even earlier.[46] 

The ascetic tradition in Christianity, on which the monastic movement is built, can of course be traced back to the New Testament.  Of particular importance was the tradition of virginity and celibacy that was grounded in the example and teaching of Jesus (Matthew 19:12) as well as in the writings of Saint Paul (I Corinthians 7)… What distinguishes the monastic movement from the earlier tradition of asceticism within Christianity is the practice of withdrawal from society.[47]

            The New Testament had a most profound effect on the early monastic movement and the relationship of the Church with society also played a major role in the development of the movement.  The persecutions preceding the acceptance of Christianity in the Roman Empire prompted many Christians to flee to avoid martyrdom and it seems that some of these banded together to form the nucleus of the earliest monastic communities.[48] The privations suffered in the desert would have contributed to the ascetic practices adopted by those living there.

            The end of these same persecutions has also been cited as a reason for the rise in monasticism.  “The monk came to replace the martyr as the hero of the early Church in its new triumphal condition.  When the triumph of the Church drove the demons from the cities, the new heroes of the faith pursued them to the desert, there to engage in single-handed combat.”[49]  While the martyrs undoubtedly held first place as heroes of the Church they were soon joined by virgins, who were also held in high regard.  By the end of the third century one writer refers to the virgins as martyrs and Athanasius, in his life of Anthony, refers to the virgins and martyrs “as testimony to the faith and teachings of Christ.”[50] 

            Very soon, monastic profession came to be seen as a second baptism, a place previously held by martyrdom. 

Martyrdom had earlier been seen as a substitute for baptism or, for those already baptized, as a second baptism.  When the monastic life came to be equated with or placed on the same level as martyrdom, it was but a short step to compare monastic profession to baptism… Just as baptism was held to forgive sins, so monastic profession came to be held to forgive sins… Since the opportunity for martyrdom no longer existed for those who wished to respond fully to the teaching and example of Christ, the development of monasticism may well have been in compensation for this, to provide an outlet for those who were not satisfied with mediocre Christianity.[51]

The notion of retreating or withdrawing from the world can be found in numerous pagan philosophies and schools.  Writers such as Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and Plotinus, all wrote of retreat from the world for the sake of contemplation and peace of mind.  “In his life of Plotinus, Porphyry portrayed his master as loving to withdraw from the city.  It has been suggested that Athanasius had this work in mind when he composed his Life of Anthony.”[52]  With these pagan influences, the Scriptures[53] offered other numerous precedents.

In the writings of Clement of Alexandria (d. ca. 200) we find the presentation of ideal of Christian man that was consistent with the Hellenistic ideal of one who has achieved contemplation of and unceasing union with the Godhead.[54]  In the Stromata, Clement stresses the importance of detachment from the world and this detachment is the fruit of knowing and contemplating the only good.  “Knowledge is purifying; it begins with repentance, separates from the passions and from what is purely pleasurable, and leads to a life of virtue.”[55]  He continues by saying that exercising control over one’s passions and the desire for good culminates in apatheia: a moderation and perfect calmness.[56]  Praise and self-oblation are the highest expression of love. “We glorify Him who gave himself in sacrifice for us, and we, in turn, sacrifice ourselves.”  The essential value in martyrdom is not the heroism of the act but the perfection of charity.[57]

By the end of the fourth century, the spiritual life came to be understood as the recovery of the divine image in man.[58]  “A man’s intention to live as a monk was the result of a personal decision.”[59]  Monastic writers, building on Clement’s system, such as Pachomius, Basil the Great, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Isaac of Syria, Athanasius of Alexandria, Origen, Evagrius Ponticus, and John Cassian, all developed the idea that the death within the monastic life, the search for apatheia (later called “purity of heart” by Cassian), and the common life of obedience, was the most effective and the most authentic expression of the Christian life.

It was within this theological and spiritual climate that Benedict of Nursia wrote his Rule[60].  Laying out in 73 relatively short chapters and a Prologue his vision of a strong monastic community, Benedict placed great emphasis on the idea that man is not called to live for himself.

Listen carefully, my son, to the master’s instructions, and attend them with the ear of your heart… The labor of obedience will bring you back to him from whom you had drifted by the sloth of disobedience.  This message of mind is for you, then, if you are ready to give up your own will, once and for all, and armed with the strong and noble weapons of obedience to do battle for the true King, Christ, the Lord.

Is there anyone here who yearns for life and desires to see good days?… What, dear brothers, is more delightful than this voice of the Lord calling to us?… We must, then, prepare our hearts and bodies for the battle of holy obedience to his instructions.  What is not possible to us by nature, let us ask the Lord to supply by the help of his grace.[61]

Here, very clearly, Benedict writing as a father to his children, lays out his vision of monastic life.  It is through the obedient performance of good works that we can hope to conquer pride and nature, relying on God’s grace rather than our own strengths or abilities, and attain eternal happiness, union with God.

Complementing Systems

Obviously Christian monasticism finds its philosophical and historical foundations based on the writings of Plato and the Neo-Platonist tradition as interpreted by early Christian theologians and mystics.  With this in mind it is interesting to note that in the practical living out of the monastic life we find the emergence of a system closely akin to Aristotle’s ethical system as found in the Nicomachean Ethics.

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to offer an exhaustive evaluation of each element of the monastic tradition in relation to Aristotle’s system, it is worth noting certain points of instruction offered by Saint Benedict in his Rule that make this comparison possible.

Immediately in the Prologue, as quoted above, Benedict questions the monk as to his motives for seeking God within the context of the monastic life.[62]  He understands that man must be formed in the practice of virtue, that is, man must be educated and given the ability to discern virtue in relation to his end as a Christian monastic.  Benedict believes that in the monastery we find a “school of the Lord’s service”[63] where, through a regimented and disciplined life, one might learn virtue.  His only concern is not the good of the individual soul but the formation of all the souls in the monastic community.  As with Aristotle’s system, the ultimate concern lay on the health of the community but is based on the virtue and fulfillment of the individual’s life.  In the case of Aristotle the focus was on the end of life, for Benedict this concern is on the monk fulfilling his Christian vocation.

Benedict, ever moderate himself, realizes that the monks of his community are not necessarily virtuous men.  In light of the philosophical climate of his time, it is reasonable to assert that Benedict most certainly believed in the frailty and fallen nature of his monks.  Here we do find dissimilarity with Aristotle’s system.  As note above, Aristotle wrote for men who were already leading a virtuous life, hoping only to help them gain a perspective on their life of virtue.[64]  Benedict however believes that “as we progress in this way of life and in faith, we shall run on the path of God’s commandments, our hearts overflowing with the inexpressible delight of love.”[65]  So while they are faulted creatures, he ultimately believes that virtue and ultimate happiness, the fulfillment of their monastic vocation (the beatific vision) is possible for his monks. 

In various chapters of the Rule, Benedict lays out his own “doctrine of the mean,” emphasizing moderation in all things, good and bad.  There must be a balance in the life of the community.[66]  The monastic life of Benedict’s Rule is not one of extreme asceticism or self-denial.  Rather, like Aristotle, Benedict recognizes the need for material security with regard to food, drink, time, recreation, and personal goods.  Those who are in need are not able to live out fully their own commitment to seek God above all things.[67]  This is the monk’s vocation of which Benedict writes in Chapter 7, the monk, “having ascended all these steps… will quickly arrive at that perfect love of God which casts out fear.”[68]  It is in the realization and contemplation of this love in the monks own interior prayer[69] the monk finds the pleasure and consolation that compels him to perform those actions which he once might have dreaded and “he will now begin to observe without effort, as though naturally, from habit, no longer out of fear of hell, but out of love for Christ, good habit and delight in virtue.”[70]  As Cistercian Abbot Blessed William of Saint-Thierry says, “they arise from their own ethics to a sort of physics, from the creatures of this world to the invisible things of God.”[71] 

For Benedict this constant, living awareness of the Presence of God and His action in the life of the monk is the ultimate end and consolation of the monastic life.  As in the case of Aristotle’s ethics, this contemplation is the result of a conscious decision to choose virtue over vice, the middle-way rather than a life of excess.  Finding pleasure in this Divine Presence the monk is compelled and encouraged to continue and deepen his own dedication to his monastic calling and into an ultimate union with the Divine in the Beatific Vision, that is, Christ inviting the individual soul and community to share in everlasting life.[72]

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