Thomas Aquinas’ Notion of Free Will:

An Exposition of Question 83, Article 1 from the Summa Theologica

  

Daniel Francis Good

 Philosophical Anthropology

Fr. Thomas Gwozdz SDB PhD

15 November 2004

 

Saint Joseph Seminary College

Saint Benedict, Louisiana 70457

I. INTRODUCTION

          Is one free to make choices? Can Bill freely choose or his choice completely inhibited?  Are people anything more than machines that make mechanical choices based upon predetermined principals?   These are questions of free will.  Philosophers, theologians, anthropologists, and psychologists still today tackle free will as an area of question.  The psychological theory of behaviorism is based upon stimulus and response.[1]  Behaviorists hold that a person’s “free choice” to do something is actually an automated response.[2]   Central-State Materialists hold that choice can be explained by the brain and nervous system.[3]  They think that “free” choice does not exist.[4]  Saint Thomas Aquinas, theologian and philosopher in the 13^th century, wrote heavily upon free will.  For both twentieth century scientists and thirteenth century Doctors of the Church, the issue of free will is an important one.  St. Thomas held that man has Liberum Arbitrium, which is freedom of judgment and freedom of choice.  St. Thomas treats several different aspects of Liberum Arbitrium in the Summa Theologica.   In question 83, Aquinas deals with free will and his arguments for its existence within man.

II. THE “I ANSWER THAT”    

The Prima Pars of the Summa Theologica contains question 83, “Of Free Will.”  The first article is “Whether Man Has Free Will.”  He offers five objections of why men do not have free will, his answer, and five responses to the objections.  In his response Thomas Aquinas states, “I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain.”[5] In short, St. Thomas says, without free will there is no point in morality.  Without free will society cannot punish i.e. if someone is murdered there is no reason to find the murderer, it is not their fault.  There is no need to reward actions, because it is not the doer of the action.  Brian Davies OP states it, “if people lacked freedom, there would be nothing we could recognize as moral philosophy, or that there would be no point in trying to engage in it… Aquinas suggests, you cannot seriously engage in ethical thinking if you deny human freedom.”[6]   Is it possible to arrest a person for murder, if they cannot be responsible for their actions?  Aquinas goes on,

…we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct   …  But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. … And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.[7]

 

He says that animals have no choice to “shun,” like the sheep and the wolf.  Aquinas says man judges.  He can look at two things and compare them i.e. either going to New York or San Diego for vacation.  A man can reason between the two and factor things in such as the cost of the each trip, the sightseeing, people he can visit, and the weather.  Man does not act on instinct like the animal.  He is able to freely judge, note here that: free judgment does not necessarily mean it is an uninhibited decision, because in his weighing the two he might have emotions on either side (for instance: if the man goes to New York he can see his sister).  Aquinas concludes that man’s ability to reason between two things is proof of his free will.  One would be hard pressed to not question the behaviorists and the central-state materialists whether they would want justice if someone were to injure one of their loved ones.  Their theory falls short here, because if someone injured B.F. Skinner’s child, Skinner would probably want justice, so he would have to disregard his own theory, if only for a little while. 

III. OBJECTION 1 AND REPLY TO OBJECTION 1

          In St. Thomas’ first objection he states, “It would seem that man has not free-will. … But man does not what he wills; for it is written "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do."[8] Therefore man has not free-will.”  St. Thomas here quotes St. Paul from Romans.[9]  He is trying to object to free will, by saying one can want or will an ideal, but fall short.  St. Thomas replies to his objection, “…the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason … can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes---namely, not to desire against reason.”[10]  St. Thomas says that the “sensitive appetite” should, but does not, always follow reason.  St. Paul’s desiring for the good, but rejection of that same good, is not an action against free-will, on the contrary it is an act of free will.  St. Paul really does have the freedom of choice, but he just chooses to go against the good.  Peter Kreeft explains that for Aquinas the sensitive appetite seeks pleasure.[11]  So, the sensitive appetite inhibits free will.  But, the will can freely will against the sensitive appetite.  Take two examples: first, a man chooses not to eat, even though there is food, even though he is hungry-his possible goal is weight loss -– second, a man eats a lot of food, even though he is not supposed to.  The first man freely acts against his appetite and does not subject himself to that sensitive appetite.  The second man could have not given in to his appetite, but he did.  It was this second man’s free choice.  In short, although the sensitive appetite can inhibit one’s free will, a person can still act freely even if it may not be equal choices. 

IV. OBJECTION 2 AND REPLY TO OBJECTION 2

          St. Thomas gives a possible second objection, “whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for it is written: "It is not of him that willeth"---namely, to will---"nor of him that runneth"---namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will.”[12] St. Thomas once again quotes St. Paul.  One could sum up this argument in a syllogism: If man is free he must have the power to will, Man does not have this power (validation: St. Paul), therefore man does not have free will.  In this argument St. Paul is quoted to say that it is a power of God, not of man.  St. Thomas has a different outlook on this text:  “Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God.”[13]  So, St. Thomas says that free will is not sufficient without God.  Brian Davies says, “Aquinas … maintains that there is a first source of existence-by which he means God.”[14]  For St. Thomas, God is the “first source of existence” or the first cause.   God causes free will and will itself.  This would make sense for St. Thomas that God would be the beginning, help through, and be the end.  Copleston says, “St. Thomas maintained that ... man … wills the end, happiness.”[15]  St. Thomas being a theologian would see this end of happiness in God; “My heart is restless until it rests in you.”[16]  So, St. Thomas says the free will finds its desirable happiness in beginning, middle, and end in God.  It is once again important to note that man may truly desire God in all things, but man does not necessarily or usually act on that desire for the good.

V. OBJECTION 3 AND REPLY TO OBJECTION 3

          St. Thomas’ third objection of free will takes a different turn, because he quotes not only the Scriptures, but Aristotle: “… What is "free is cause of itself," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will… (he then quotes Scripture to prove his point) … Therefore man has not free-will.”[17]  According to this argument, since God is the cause of free will, man cannot have free will, for “free is the cause of itself.”  Since God is the cause of will, man is not free.  This argument suggests that according to Aquinas God is all cause of the will, but Aquinas does not hold this.  Aquinas states:

Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.[18]

 

He argues that liberty is not necessarily dependent upon the first cause.  Aquinas holds that God is the first cause, but not every efficient cause.  Man chooses to act.  St. Thomas’ statement, “He the cause of this very thing in them,” shows that God is the first causer of the thing (free will), but not the causer of every action that is of man.  

          In this reply Aquinas also validates free will as fulfilling the principal of sufficient reason.  The principal of sufficient reason states, a thing must have its cause in itself or in another.  The first cause for free will is God, cause in another.  Aquinas says, “Free will is the cause of its own movement.”  So, the movement of free will finds its cause in itself.

 

 

VI. OBJECTION 4 AND REPLY TO OBJECTION 4

          St. Thomas’ fourth objection states, “whoever has free-will is master of his own actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk." Therefore man has not free-will.”[19]  This argument is basically a simple syllogism that is validated by the quoting of Sacred Scripture.  Aquinas answers this: "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.”[20]  Aquinas says that one does not own the will (not the master of the will), but the owns the choice.  The will, for Aquinas, receives divine assistance, but it is the choice (which is aided by the will) that man is truly master over.
VII. OBJECTION 5 AND REPLY TO OBJECTION 5

          The fifth objection uses Aristotle’s Ethics to argue:  “…the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing.”[21]  This argument says that man is directed toward an end and so all his actions lead to that end.  In other words, man’s final cause directs all his efficient causes, so that all efficient causes find themselves in the final cause.  Therefore man cannot have free will, because all efficient causes must be directed at man’s final cause and cannot make a proper choice.  St. Thomas answers:

Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said \ But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will. The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.[22]

St. Thomas distinguishes two kinds of quality.  The first is natural, which does seek the end of man, happiness.  The second is adventitious, which have to do with passions and habits.  The first kind, natural, is not subject to free will, whereas the second one is.  The first kind is not “prejudicial to the will.”  So, natural quality, which seeks the end of happiness, does not infringe upon the will, because of the judgment of reason. 
VIII. AN OBSERVATION ABOUT FREE WILL AND THE DETERMINISTS

It would be interesting to see what would happen if everyone completely agreed with the central-state materialists and the behaviorists.  If there was no notion of free will, to see all the rules go into the garbage.  No one could help themselves.  People would probably return to a more savage style of living.  If one were to get something good it could be taken away without retribution.  People’s professions would die out due to the fact that they would be worrying about protecting their family or foraging for food.  Everyone would be worrying about their own self and families.  Eventually education would fall away and people would forget that people don’t have free-will and start holding people accountable for their actions again.  Then the whole process would begin to restart until we get back to the central-state materialist point of view.

IX. CONCLUSION

          St. Thomas’ explanation of free will, contained in question 83, leads to many broad topics.  Without a notion of free will the world would surly be in chaos.  St. Thomas not only gives arguments for free will but also takes the objections to free will and answers them.  Although, St. Thomas did not have central-state materialists and behaviorists, he gives good arguments that even today are helpful in a deterministic world. 

 

 

 

 

Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially.

- ST. 1a, 6, 3.